Nuclear Proliferation Deterrence Failure: Paradoxes of Preventive Military Strikes in the Iranian Case
Keywords:
nuclear proliferation, preventive war, deterrence failure, security dilemma, counterproliferation, coercive diplomacyAbstract
This study examines the counterintuitive relationship
between preventive military strikes and nuclear
proliferation outcomes, focusing on the 2024–2025 U.S.-
Israeli bombing campaign against Iranian nuclear
facilities. Contrary to the deterrence logic that
underpinned Operation Rising Lion, empirical evidence
suggests that kinetic counter-proliferation strategies may
inadvertently accelerate rather than retard adversarial
nuclear weapons programs. Drawing on the security dilemma theory (Jervis, 1976; Herz, 1950) and prospect
theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), this article argues
that preventive strikes generate "rally-around-the-bomb"
effects that transform latent nuclear latency into active
weapons pursuit. Through comparative case analysis of
Iraq (1981), Syria (2007), and Iran (2004–2025), the
study employs process tracing and counterfactual
reasoning to isolate causal mechanisms. Findings
indicate that while strikes temporarily degrade technical
capabilities, they simultaneously (a) legitimate nuclear
weapons as guarantors of regime survival, (b)
consolidate domestic elite consensus around
proliferation, and (c) incentivize dispersal and hardening
of nuclear infrastructure. The research contributes to
nuclear security studies by identifying the proliferation
paradox: the very measures designed to prevent nuclear
acquisition may, under conditions of regime insecurity
and international isolation, produce the outcome they
seek to avoid. Policy implications suggest that integrated
strategies combining coercive diplomacy, verification
mechanisms, and security assurances may prove more
efficacious than unilateral kinetic action in achieving
counter-proliferation objectives.
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